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by James Larry Taulbee*
and
John Andersont
O ver the past thirty-five years few analysts have disputed the general
proposition that the Charter of the United Nations prohibits the use
of force except in self-defense. This prohibition presumably follows from
the obligations to use peaceful means to settle disputes1 and to refrain
from the threat or use of force except in self-defense. 2 While not explic-
itly mentioned in the Charter, most have assumed that this general prohi-
bition extended to armed reprisals as well.
However, the efficacy of the collective security regime established by
the Charter depended upon the effectiveness of the Security Council in
providing collective measures to protect vital interests and redress griev-
ances. Needless to say, the political conditions necessary for consistent
and effective Security Council action never materialized. The Security
Council's failure to act as the framer of the Charter produced a spirited
debate among scholars, statesmen and other interested parties over the
scope of the right of self-defense permitted by article 51. What initially
had been visualized as a subsidiary principle of order now was elevated to
an important means of guaranteeing the integrity of state interests.
Legal scholars divided into two main camps: those who argued from a
* Associate Professor, Emory University; Ph.D., The Johns Hopkins University (1970);
B.A., Purdue University (1954).
t Associate Professor, LaGrange College; Ph.D., Emory University (1979); M.A., Flor-
ida State University (1971); B.A., Johnson State College (1964). The authors would like to
thank Jean Meadows for doing certain essential tasks associated with the production of the
manuscript.I U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
2 Id. at art. 2, para. 4; id. at art. 51.
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community interest perspective and those who argued from a statist per-
spective. The community interest proponents assumed that narrowly cir-
cumscribing the circumstances which justified a legitimate use of force
constituted the best way to minimize the use of force. 3 The community
interest in containing the use of violence superseded individual state in-
terests in redressing particular wrongs.4 Conversely, statists argued that
such restrictions were both unrealistic and dangerous: effective protection
of state interest required a broader, discretionary approach. 5 Nonetheless,
both groups accepted as given the continuing validity of article 2(4),'
even though the collapse of the collective security arrangements of the
Charter had effectively removed the possibility of collective sanctions as a
means of redressing delicts within the community of nations.'
The vague and inconclusive debates within the Security Council on
cases brought before it reinforced the sense of normative decay. In addi-
tion, the upsurge of violence in the Middle East and elsewhere during the
1960's and 1970's provided a stark contrast between normative theory
and empirical practice. Derek Bowett noted:
Not surprisingly, as states have grown increasingly disillusioned
about the capacity of the Security Council to afford them protection
against what they would regard as illegal and highly injurious conduct
directed against them, they have resorted to self-help in the form of re-
prisals and have acquired the confidence that, in so doing, they will not
incur anything more than a formal censure from the Security Council.
The law on reprisals is, because of its divorce from actual practice, rap-.
idly degenerating to a stage where its normative character is in question.8
To any observer of contemporary international politics, Professor
Bowett's declaration should not be surprising. What is surprising, how-
ever, is the relative lack of attention given to the problem. Apart from
articles dealing with the occasional spectacular event, the Mayaguez for
example, the literature on retaliation and reprisal is sparse. Evidently,
contemporary scholars, jurists and statesmen have labelled invalid Gu-
glielmo Ferrero's observation that the conscience of the world will not
accept the causistry of subtle jurists rationalizing inaction in situations
3 I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 279, 373 (1963);
Falk, The Relevance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioning of International
Law: An Intermediate View, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 145 (S. Hoffmann &
K. Deutsch eds. 1968).
4 See R. FALK, THE END OF WORLD ORDER chs. 8, 9, 13 (1983).
8 D. BowETT, SELF DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-25 (1958); J. STONE, LEGAL CON-
TROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 185-200 (1959).
6 I. BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 269-70.
7 Not since the initial phases of the Korean conflict has the Security Council imposed
effective and meaningful sanctions against a state.6 Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1972).
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which, to the uninitiated, appear to be violent breaches of the peace.9 We
do not think this observation is invalid. Our purpose, then, will be to ana-
lyze the traditional law governing the use of reprisal, analyze the use of
force short of war over the past few years to clarify situations and claims
and then address the question of whether state practice has established a
new set of normative guidelines to replace the absolute standards found
in the Charter.
I. TRADITIONAL LAW AND REPRISAL
Commentators have long treated force short of war as a category of
self-help regulated by the twin principles of necessity and proportional-
ity.10 The anomaly, of course, is that nineteenth century international law
presumably regulated the use of force short of war while the resort to war
remained outside the scope of legal restraint."' Further, permissible self-
help was generally identified in separate forms: (1) armed reprisals, (2)
armed intervention and (3) pacific blockade.
In theory these three forms of self-help served as sanctions to enforce
obligations where important interests were at stake. These interests did
not usually involve the security of the state; yet, they were interests that
states felt the need to preserve, though not at the cost of war. In practice,
pacific blockade and armed intervention constituted doctrines without
clear parameters that distinguished them from other measures of self-
help which did not enjoy legal status.12
A survey of texts and arbitral decisions of the period reveals little
agreement on either the nature of the interests nor the types of offensive
conduct that might justify the resort to armed intervention or pacific
blockade. Indeed, Verzijl and others dismissed pacific blockade and
armed intervention as political doctrines used to justify the coercion of
the weak by the strong.18 In contrast, a moderately well-defined doctrine
relating to the use of armed reprisals can be traced, although commenta-
tors attribute a certainty to customary practice that seems unwarranted
by the diplomatic record.14
9 F. GROB, Tm RELATIVITY OF WAR AND PEACE 149 (1949).
10 See, e.g., 1 E. DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA LoI NATURELLE:
AppLIQUgS A LA CoNDurrE ET AUX AFFAIRS DES NATIONS ET DES SOUVERAINS 531-41 (1916)
(reproduction of books I and II of the 1758 edition); 8 J. VERZIJIL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 39-40 (1968).
2n J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 397-400 (H. Waldock 6th ed. 1963).
11 See, e.g., W. HALL, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 82-86 (3d ed. 1890); 2 E. STow-
ELL & H. MUNRO, INTERNATIONAL CASES: WAR AND NEUTRALITY 3 (1916); 2 J. WESTLAKE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-10 (2d ed. 1913).
Js j. VERZiL, supra note 10, at 43-48.
14 M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
207-10 (1961).
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By definition, reprisals are injurious acts that ordinarily would be il-
legal but which become legal acts of enforcement by dint of the target
state's prior illegal act.15 In principle, then, reprisals are sanctions, per-
mitted as a response by a state to any delinquency by another state. Vat-
tel wrote: "Reprisals are used between nation and nation to do them-
selves justice when they cannot otherwise obtain it.""8
Commentators generally have cited the Naulilaa Case17 as the deci-
sion that makes the definitive statement of the conditions under which
acts of reprisal may be taken and the limitations upon such acts. First,
the exercise of the customary right of reprisal required the establishment
of target state's liability for a prior illegal act.18 Traditionally, because
only states could be the subject of an international claim, it was not suffi-
cient that the injury or damage resulted from an act which violated inter-
national law. It had to be shown that the target state was in some way
responsible for the violation. Imputability served to establish the charac-
ter of the connection between act and damage. 9
The second condition for the lawful exercise of reprisal was the in-
ability of the injured state to secure reparation from the offending state
through peaceful means.20 Given that the exercise of reprisal assumed
that a peaceful resolution to a dispute would be sought first, until efforts
at peaceful solution had proven unfruitful the necessity for forcible en-
forcement did not arise. Interestingly, the panel in Naulilaa cited no
precedents for the requirement that the claimant states must first seek
peaceful redress. This seems a curious omission because the requirement
formed a necessary condition for the exercise of private reprisal and
seemed well-established in nineteenth century practice.2
Taken together, these two conditions supposedly define necessity.
The difficulty, however, is that they provide no guidance either to the
,5 W. LEvi, CONTEMPORY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 312 (1979); G.
VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 553 (4th ed. 1981).
16 E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 283 (J. Chitty trans. & ed. 1852); see Cushing v.
United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 1, 39 (1886) (quoting Vattel); see also Maccoby, Reprisals as a
Measure of Redress Short of War, 2 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 60 (1924).
1 Responsabilit6 de L'Allemagne a Raison des Dommages Causbs dans les Colonies
Portugaises du Sud de L'Afrique (Portugal v. Germany), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1011 (1928)
[hereinafter cited as the Naulilaa Case]. See also Portugal v. Germany (The Naulilaa Case),
4 Ann. Dig. 526 (Special Arbitral Tribunal 1928).
18 Naulilaa Case, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1027.
19 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 617 (1957); Starke, Imputability in Inter-
national Delinquencies, 19 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 104 (1938).
20 Naulilaa Case, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1026-27.
21 E. COLBERT, RETALIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 18, 42 (1948); Clark, The English
Practice with Regard to Reprisals by Private Persons, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 694, 695-96 (1933);
de la Briere, Evolution de la doctrine et de la pratique en matiere de represailles, 22
RECUEIL DE CoURs 252, 258 (1928).
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nature of the interests that could be protected by armed reprisal or to the
scope of injury to those interests that would provide an injured state with
a legitimate claim to employ armed reprisal. Further, a full reading of
Naulilaa sheds no further light on these questions. That the opinion in
Naulilaa did not address these questions should come as no surprise to
anyone familiar with the facts of the case. The absence of Portuguese
liability with respect to the original action meant that any German repri-
sal, violent or non-violent, would have failed to meet any reasonable defi-
nition of necessity.
Texts of the pre-World War II era give little additional guidance.
Most writers asserted that not every breach of international obligation
justifies a resort to armed reprisal, but then failed to specify the nature of
the delictual conduct that would permit a use of force in response. Op-
penheim's position, for example, would seem to permit a forcible response
to any delinquency that involved willfully malicious behavior.2 2
This lack of specific guidance can be explained in various ways. In
part, commentators of this era still saw an essential connection between
the availability of force as a sanction and the preservation of state inter-
ests. 23 Also, unlike the Charter, the Covenant of the League of Nations
did not prohibit coercive measures short of war.
Finally, the third Naulilaa requirement-that of response roughly
proportional to the original delict 2 -presumably limited the use of force.
As with the conditions governing necessity, this Naulilaa standard did
not address the practical tests by which proportionality may be mea-
sured. Scholars have suggested many standards, but the critical questions
seem to be related to the purpose of the reprisal. Earlier practice distin-
guished between reparation and retaliation with the former being identi-
fied solely with reprisal. Clark, in his discussion of private reprisals in
domestic legal systems noted that "[r]etaliation involves the use of force
to inflict an injury in return for an injury inflicted; reprisal involves the
use of force to secure compensation for a loss by taking property.25 Simi-
larly, Hyde stated:
For the sake of clearness, and for the purpose of preserving solid
distinctions of both historical and etymological worth, it is deemed wise
22 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 137-51 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952).
23 N. Politis, rapporteur of the panel of the Institute de Droit International, summa-
rized the opinion of the members by noting that "le droit des gens a dft tr~s longtemps
tolrer et m~me reconnaitre comme I6gitimes les actes de repr~sailles, parce qui'ils 6taient
n~cessaires." 38 ANNUAnE DE L'INSTITUT DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 26 (1934). See also F.
HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE 317-20 (1963) (discussion of the collective secur-
ity regime under the League of Nations); M. KAPLAN & N. KATzEBACH, supra note 14, at
214.
24 Naulilaa Case, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1028.
2' Clark, supra note 21, at 702.
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to confine the use of the term 'reprisals' to the act of taking or withhold-
ing of any form of property of a foreign State or its nationals, for the
purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, reparation on account of the
consequences of internationally illegal conduct for which redress has
been,Tefused.
2 6
Many later writers did not maintain the distinction between retalia-
tion and reparation, instead of treating reprisals as a general sanction.
Consequently, the purpose of reprisal became two-fold: reparation and
deterrence. For example, Hindmarsh argued that a state may take repri-
sals in order to "secure redress for, or prevent recurrence of acts or omis-
sions which under international law constitute international delin-
quency." 27 The two separate and distinct purposes, reparation and
deterrence, produced two vastly different standards for assessing propor-
tionality of action. Securing redress suggests that proportionality must be
measured by the extent of the damage stemming from the delict, whereas
preventing recurrence (deterrence) suggests a more indeterminate stan-
dard based on a calculation of what might be necessary to "teach a les-
son." On behalf of the broader definition, advocates have argued that, if
reprisals serve as sanctions, and by inference order-maintaining acts, lim-
iting actions to those necessary to achieve reparation may prove inade-
quate to dissuade the law-breaking state from undertaking similar actions
in the future.28 The dilemma stems from the fact that while the wrong
done gives some tangible though rough basis by which to gauge propor-
tionality, no equally simple and tangible standard exists by which to
gauge the amount of force necessary to convince an errant state to abide
20 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1662 (1945).
27 A. HINDMARSH, FORCE IN PEACE 58 (1933). Compare this definition with Bowett,
supra note 8, at 3: "[T]o impose reparation for the harm done, or to compel a satisfactory
settlement of the dispute created by the initial illegal act, or to compel the delinquent state
to abide by the law in the future."
2 The Tribunal in the Naulilaa decision said:
[T]his definition does not require that the reprisals should be proportionate to the
offence. On this point authors, unanimous until a few years ago, begin to be di-
vided in their views. The majority regard a certain proportion between the offence
and the reprisals as a necessary condition of the legitimacy of the latter. Others
among the more modern authors no longer require this condition.
2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1025-26. The Tribunal mentioned only Hatschek and Anziotti in
the minority group. However, on this point, one should note the more contemporary opinion
of Professors McDougal and Feliciano who argue that reprisals should be "adapted and re-
lated, not so much to the past illegality but rather and primarily to the future purpose
sought." M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM PUBLIC WORLD ORDER 682
(1961) (emphasis added). This observation occurs in their discussion of belligerent reprisals,
but accurately reflects their essential theoretical orientation. Compare F. KALSHOVEN, BEL-
LIGERENT REPRISALS 33 (1971) ("to coerce the addressee to change its policy and bring it into
line with the requirements of international law, be it in respect of the past, the present or
the future"); A. HINDMARSH, supra note 27; Bowett, supra note 8, at 3.
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by the rule at issue in future cases.2 9
The more inclusive definition became generally accepted in the
1930's. Unfortunately, post-1945 scholars have given only passing notice
to the problems caused by the joining of purposes, and time and events
have militated against clarification.3 0 First, the lack of state practice after
the Naulilaa decision meant that the omissions and deficiencies of Nauli-
laa went largely unexamined.3 1 Second, the legal community became
more concerned with the legal questions surrounding the resort to war
than with the regulation of force short of war. 32 Finally, the ratification of
the Charter proscribed forcible reprisals and focused scholarly debate on
the conditions attending the lawful exercise of self-defense.38 Hence,
Naulilaa still stands as a statement of relevant principles, but the opera-
tional criteria that serve as the essential link between statements of prin-
ciple and application in context remain primitive in form.
H. THE CHARTER, SELF-DEFENSE AND REPRISAL
Self-defense, like reprisal, is a form of self-help and as such is also
governed by necessity and proportionality." The assumption that the
Charter made forcible reprisals illegal while permitting self-defense as-
sumes that clear distinctions may be drawn between the two. Yet, the
presumption that forcible reprisals were outlawed has tended to foreclose
29 One should note the parallel problem in assessing measures of self-defense: is propor-
tionality measured by the amount of force necessary to repel the immediate danger or by
the amount of force necessary to remove the danger? See supra notes 3 and 5.
30 Contemporary texts cite the conditions laid down by the Naulilaa decision. More
recent texts refer to Vietnam, the Mayaguez and the Middle East as situations where repri-
sals have occurred, but do little more. See, e.g., J. BRIERLY, supra note 11, at 410-12; L
BROWNLIE, supra note 3, at 279; W. GOULD, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 590-93
(1957); L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 22; J. STONE, supra note 5; R. Swinr, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CURENT AND CLAssic 479-84 (1969); G. VON GLAHN, supra note 15, at 553-59.
51 Of events specifically characterized as forcible reprisals during the inter-war period,
the only one on the scale of Naulilaa, was the Italian shelling of Corfu in 1923. J. BARRos,
THE CORFU INCIDENT OF 1923: MUSSOLINI AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1965). See G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBu-
NALS (2d ed. 1949); F. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1952).
u2 F. HiNsLEY, supra note 23; W. SCHIFFER, THE LEGAL COMMUNrrY OF MANKIND (1954);
F. WALTERS, supra note 31; Niemeyer, The Balance Sheet of the League Experiment, 6
INT'L ORGANIZATION 551-56 (1952).
33 L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMEN-
TARY AND DocumENTs 43-55 (3d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTARY AND Docu-
MENTs]; R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL OR-
GANS O1 THE UNITED NATIONS 173-74, 197-210, 217-18 (1963).
34 For discussions of necessity and proportionality within the Charter framework, see
Baxter, The Legal Consequences of the Unlawful Use of Force Under the Charter, 62
PRoc. Am. Soc. INT'L L. 74 (1968); Moore, Legal Dimensions of the Decision to Intercede in
Cambodia, 65 Ass. J. INT'L L. 53 (1971).
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systematic comparison of the two.
Under the collective security arrangements of the Charter, self-de-
fense was originally visualized as a temporary expedient, available to the
target state until the enforcement machinery of the Charter could swing
into action.15 Judgment and punishment (retaliation/retribution) would
then become the province of the Security Council as the authoritative
representative and guardian of the broader community interest. The
Charter signified an attempt to substitute collective judgment and en-
forcement for individual judgment and measures of forcible self-help. Re-
prisals became illegal because the right to authorize the use of force as a
sanction now would reside with the community, not the individual mem-
ber. In sum, just as the development of centralized institutions for judg-
ment and enforcement eliminated the need for private reprisals within
domestic legal systems, the Charter would eliminate the need for all
forms of self-help (save self-defense) in the international legal system.
In light of the failure of the Security Council to operate as intended,
the distinction between various forms of forcible self-help became impor-
tant, particularly if one continues to assume that self-defense is legal
while forcible reprisal is not. In theory, we can differentiate between the
two in terms of purpose and time frame. The purpose of self-defense is to
protect and prevent damage to the essential rights of territorial integrity
and political independence necessary to the existence of a state. In con-
trast, reprisals have a punitive purpose, coming only after the harm has
been done and other methods of resolving a dispute have failed to pro-
duce a satisfactory result. Self-defense, then, entails action immediately
prior to or in immediate response to actions directed against the most
vital interests of a state.38 Reprisals consist of action taken only after de-
liberation.3 7 Considering purpose and time, presumably the provocation
that would give rise to the necessity for self-defense would be of a much
different character than that which would justify reprisal.
35 "It should be noted that under Article 51 the inherent right of self-defence is availa-
ble until the Security Council has taken the measures to maintain international peace and
security." R. HIGGINS, supra note 33, at 205; see also COMMENTARY AND DocuMENTs, supra
note 33, at 342-47. For a concise discussion of the theory of collective security, see . CLAuD,
SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES ch. 12 (4th ed. 1984).
"8 We are well aware of the controversial status of anticipatory self-defense in contem-
porary debates over self-defense. Our position follows that of J. STONE, supra note 5, at 245.
See contra L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 141-45 (2d ed. 1979). Under customary inter-
national law self-defense was justified when the necessity for action was "instant, over-
whelming and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." 2 J. MOORE, A
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906) (discussion of the destruction of the Caroline
(Great Britain-United States 1837)). For an interesting discussion, see Jennings, The Caro-
line and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82-99 (1938).
37 The requirement that states should just seek peaceful redress without success would
seem to support this conclusion. See Naulilaa Case, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1011 (1928).
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At first glance these distinctions seem to provide a clear separation,
but critics have argued that upon close examination neither purpose nor
time, nor any combination of the two, sufficiently differentiates reprisals
from self-defense. 38 As noted above, the broader definition of reprisal
adopted by most contemporary writers would permit a reprisal to force
the law-breaking state to observe the law in future cases. If we include
deterrence of future violations among the legitimate purposes of reprisal,
then reprisals may reasonably be viewed as protective in purpose as well
as punitive.
Moreover, Bowett 8 and Tucker 40 both argue that these distinctions
hold only so long as the incidents occur as separate, distinct episodes
where provocation and response can be identified with certainty. The
traditional law rested upon the assumption that a nor-
mal-peaceful-relationship existed between the states involved, and so
any departure from the norm could be readily demonstrated and identi-
fied. But, in the traditional law, peace meant only the absence of a formal
state of war, so "peace" encompassed a wide continuum of relationships
ranging from close alliance to intense hostility. In situations legally char-
acterized as peace, states could engage in continuing action/reaction!
counter-action retaliations in attempts to punish each other for self-judg-
ed violations of the law. In such situations, Bowett argues that the use of
purpose and time frame to distinguish between self-defense and reprisal
becomes less relevant to the extent that states view the actions in retalia-
tion as having a protective purpose.
41
It is necessary to evaluate these observations, however, in light of
Tucker's question: from the standpoint of the customary law, what would
a right to take forcible reprisals add to the scope of the existing right to
self-help that is not already contained within the right of self-defense?
42
Tucker challenges the supposition that there are situations between
"peace" and "aggression" that may require a limited use of force to re-
solve. In essence, Tucker contends that no distinction can be made be-
tween the conditions defining the necessity that would justify the resort
to measures of self-defense and those which would justify a resort to mea-
sures of reprisal. 4
3
Self-defense and reprisal do share a structural similarity in that both
are generally characterized as measures of self-help and thus are governed
38 Bowett, supra note 8, at 3-5; Comment, Reprisals and Self-Defense: The Customary
Law, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 586 (1972).
3 Bowett, supra note 8, at 3-5.
40 Comment, supra note 38, at 591-92.
41 Bowett, supra note 8, at 3-4.
42 Comment, supra note 38, at 589.
43 Id. at 589-90.
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by the principles of necessity and proportionality. Tucker takes this
structural similarity and the fact that both concepts are generally treated
as measures of enforcement as sufficient evidence that the two are func-
tionally equivalent and merely constitute interchangeable rationales, self-
defense being preferred because the Charter legitimizes its use."
Self-defense and reprisal, as with many concepts that categorize so-
cial action, lack precise lines of demarcation since they overlap in margi-
nal cases and may share some common parameters. Tucker's line of rea-
soning, however, does not square with state practice, historical or
contemporary. As defined by the literature on the legitimate scope of self-
defense, clearly the necessity that justifies force in self-defense comes
from an immediate threat to the vital interests of the state such as terri-
torial integrity and politcal independence.45 While Tucker may minimize
the difference between force used in response to a perceived threat to
existence and the comparatively limited low-level use of force by a state
in response to nuisance attacks by "irregular forces" from across a neigh-
boring border,46 statesmen still recognize self-defense and reprisal as en-
tirely separate and well-defined with respect to scope and purpose,47 even
if, in obeisance to the Charter, the distinction has been somewhat ob-
scured by pragmatic decisions justifying actions in terms of the only "le-
gitimate" rationale: self-defense.
Moreover, as Kaplan and Katzenbach have noted: "The world of the
lawyers was divided into war and peace; the world of the statesman saw
intermediary stages in the political process."'4" This divorce between the
legal dichotomy and the practice of states has always placed a great strain
on the ingenuity of the legal fraternity. It is in the attempt to deal with
the lack of congruence between the world of the lawyer and the world of
the statesman that Giradoux's description of international law as the
training ground for the imagination49 becomes most applicable.
This can be seen in the opinions of jurists who try to cope with the
legal effects of executive decisions. In American practice, the claims aris-
ing out of the conflict with France from 1793 to 1800 furnish a number of
44 Id. at 594.
45 D. BowE'r, SELF DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-25, 181 (1959); 2 J. MOORE,
supra note 36; J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER (1959).
46 Comment, supra note 38.
47 Compare the difference between the basis for state claims (self defense) and the lan-
guage of Security Council deliberation/decision in the "Synopsis of Selected Reprisal Inci-
dents" in Bowett, supra note 8, at 33-36.
48 M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, supra note 14, at 207. For a review and critique of the
issues raised by the war-peace dichotomy, see McDougal & Feliciano, The Initiation of Co-
ercion: A Multi-Temporal Analysis, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 241 (1958).
49 J. GiRAUDOUX, TIGER AT THE GATES 45 (1955).
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examples."' The Congress and the President authorized certain specific
protective actions, e.g., the seizure of armed vessels and the retaking of
American vessels captured by any such armed vessel. The French effort
consisted of issuing commissions to privateers to raid American com-
merce. Neither state considered itself formally at war, the French describ-
ing their actions as a "mark of just discontent." '51 In one of the first cases
arising out of these circumstances, Bas v. Tingy,52 Justice Washington
noted:
But hostilities may subsist between two nations more confined in its
nature and extent being limited as to places, persons and things; and this
is more properly termed imperfect war; because not solemn, and because
those who are authorised to commit hostilities, act under special author-
ity, and can go no further than to the extent of their commission. 3
Later in the century, addressing the question with respect to the
cases which came to be known as the "French spoliation claims," Judge
Davis said:
Acts of retaliation are admitted to be justifiable under certain cir-
cumstances. They may exist when the two nations are otherwise at peace,
but they are in their nature acts of warfare. They depart from the field of
negotiation into that of force .... To term the decrees of France and
the acts of their privateers under them "acts of reprisal does not alter
the facts or the legal position. That position has been defined by the
Supreme Court of the United States as limited partial war. We, following
the path indicated by that tribunal have defined it as "limited war in its
nature similar to a prolonged series of reprisals.""
Judge Davis examined intent and intensity to establish the character
of the American and French actions. American intent, as expressed in the
authorization to use force, limited American actions to the protection of
American commerce in the form of capturing French privateers or other
commerce raiders and recovering American ships taken as prizes. The leg-
islation did not permit American eizures of equivalent value from French
commerce.55 More to the point, however, and in answer to Tucker's con-
tention, Presidents Washington and Adams clearly perceived the situa-
tion as something more than guarding the coastline against smugglers and
pirates and of such a significantly different magnitude as to require ex-
50 For a thorough discussion, see F. GROB, supra note 9, at 17; Comment, The French
Spoliation Claims, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 359-86, 629-49, 830-57 (1912).
" Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340, 372 (1886). For a short discussion, see F. GROB,
supra note 9, at 21; Comment, supra note 38, at 361.
:2 4 U.S. (4 Dal.) 37 (1800).
3' Id. at 40.
" Hooper v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408, 456 (1887).
15 Id. at 427-28, 439.
1984
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
ceptional measures involving the use of force, but not of sufficient magni-
tude to require a declaration of war.56 Both sides stressed the limited na-
ture of the conflict and, by implication, the comparatively limited nature
of the interests at stake.57 The fact that reprisals and self-defense may
both serve as a protective purpose implies nothing about the importance
of the immediate interests to be protected relative to other interests at
stake. The perceived immediacy of threat (intensity) that defines the ne-
cessity governing reprisals remains quite distinct from that which gives
rise to the necessity governing self-defense. If time frame and purpose do
not provide an adequate distinction, purpose and intensity do.
This conclusion does slight one aspect of the Bowett-Tucker argu-
ment. Judge Davis refers to a series of reprisals, 8 and the Bowett-Tucker
critique of purpose as a differentiating factor utilizes "reprisals-in-se-
ries" 50 to suggest the impossibility of drawing clear distinctions between
self-defense and reprisals. Actually, Bowett's observation illustrates not
so much the difficulty of separating reprisals from self-defense as the
more fundamental problem of jurisprudence that comes from treating re-
prisals as general sanctions. The Naulilaa paradigm does assume that de-
lict and response can be identified with certainty and that the target of
the reprisal does not resist by responding in kind. In other words, the
paradigm assumes that a reprisal is a specific response to a specific viola-
tion of the law.6 0 If reprisals are to be considered as sanctions, they must
then serve the function of providing a definitive answer to questions of
right and wrong. However, given that the absence of authoritative and
impartial third-party observers allows each state the freedom to charac-
terize events according to its own interpretation of the issues and that a
target government generally will have the capacity to resist any use of
force and retaliate in kind, considered reflection suggests that the single
action/single reaction sequence exemplified by Naulilaa may be the ex-
ception rather than the rule. Onuf argues, in consequence, a reprisals-
series cannot have legal meaning because the essential idea runs counter
to the specific delict/specific sanction assumption central to the definition
of reprisals as sanctions.
61
Again, as argued above, difficulties that seem to abound in hypotheti-
cal examples tend to dissipate somewhat when analyzing specific situa-
56 Id. at 428-29.
57 M. ZAHNISER, UNCERTAIN FRIENDSHIP: AMERICAN-FRENCH RELATIONSHIPS THROUGH
THE COLD WAR 75-80 (1975).
58 Hooper v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408, 431-33 (1887).
See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
o This observation is inherent in the definition of reprisal as a sanction; i.e., a reprisal
may not be undertaken against a reprisal. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 22.
61 N. ONUF, REPRISALS: RULES, RITUALs, RATIONALES 9-11 (Monograph No. 42, 1974)
(Center of International Studies, Princeton University).
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tions. First, the delict-sanction framework does not, in principle, preclude
a series of actions to compel a solution. Second, despite speculation, there
are relatively few, if any, historical reprisals series described as such.2
Third, to the extent that "reprisals-in-series" does describe the contem-
porary problem, the traditional reprisals framework may have little rele-
vance. This possibility shall now be examined.
III. DEFINING THE CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT
To extend Kaplan and Katzenbach's observation to contemporary
discussions on the use of force, the Charter divided the world of contem-
porary international law into self-defense and aggression, and the inten-
sity and persistence of the controversy over the scope of self-defense re-
flects the inadequacy of this new legal dichotomy. In post-1945 literature,
attempts to distinguish between de jure and de facto war,63 material war
and formal war," and advocacy for status mixtus (or intermediacy)6 5 il-
lustrate dissatisfaction with the Charter formulation and again suggest
that Tucker's position does not coincide with the canon of political
practice.
In the past forty years, the activities of "national liberation move-
ments" have become a major concern. By whatever name, these groups or
movements seek to overthrow existing governments. Prior to 1945, if and
when threats to established governments emerged from within national
territory, the state employed its internal police forces, national guard or
military to subdue the movement. Customary norms of international law
treated the situation as a matter primarily within domestic jurisdiction.6
The important point here is the assumption that "statehood" as a legal
concept implied certain competencies and obligations as well as granting
privileges and rights. If states could not, or would not, perform their obli-
gation to subdue these threats, then the affected state had a right to re-
dress the situation. Thus, if an adjacent state failed to prevent guerrilla
operations from within its territory, the target government retained the
right to enforce the fundamental* duty of respect for territorial integrity
62 Onuf provides no historical examples, only alluding occasionally to the contemporary
Middle East.
'3 Wright, When Does War Exist?, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 368 (1932).
L. KOTSCH, THE CONCEPT OF WAR IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 52 (1956).
65 Jessup, Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status Between Peace
and War, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 100 (1954); Schwarzenberger, Jus Pacis ac Belli?, 37 AM. J.
INT'L L. 473 (1943). For an extended and confused discussion linking reprisals to intermedi-
acy, see Comment, Armed Reprisals During Intermediacy-A New Framework for Analysis
in International Law, 17 ViLL. L. REv. 270 (1971).
" G. VON GLAHN, supra note 15, at 84-86; infra note 69.
67 G. VON GLAHN, supra note 15, at 84-86.
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and political independence. The lack of ideological fervor combined with
the small number of recognized states kept the law closely attuned to
objective political reality.68
Today, neither of these conditions continue. Guerrilla forces seeking
to overthrow established governments often operate from safehavens lo-
cated in adjoining states sympathetic to their cause. 9 The guerrilla insur-
gents may control some limited areas and population within the
safehaven state, functioning somewhat as a government in exile, but in
most cases they do not.70 Nor do these guerrilla forces operate as tradi-
tionally defined revolutionaries by securing and controlling specific geo-
graphic areas and populations within the target government's territory.
The state of refuge often pleads lack of competence or knowledge (i.e.,
Lebanon), leaving the target state no viable legal recourse beyond mea-
sures taken within its own borders.
The literature on the Middle East graphically illustrates the problem.
The Arab-Israeli-Palestinian relationship fits none of the traditional cate-
gories, yet much of the impetus to revise current Charter prohibitions
comes from incidents in this ongoing confrontation. The lack of appropri-
ate terminology results in cumbersome, imprecise and idiosyncratic de-
scriptions such as quasi-belligerency, 1 para-war 72 or simply that a no war,
no peace status exists. 3 The importance of this prior consideration can be
68 The traditional law also provided guidance on how other states within the commu-
nity were to deal, if at all, with revolutionary forces within another state. Two specific
norms, insurgent recognition and recognition of insurgents as a belligerent power, defined
the legal obligations for surrounding states as well as for the revolutionary forces. See, e.g.,
the Alabama Claims Arbitration where the tribunal ruled that Great Britain was liable for
damages caused by the Confederate ship Alabama: "[T]he due diligence referred to in the
first and third of the said rules ought to be exercised by neutral governments in exact pro-
portion to the risk to which either of the belligerents may be exposed from a failure to fulfill
the obligations of neutrality on their part." 1 J. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATIONS 654 (1898). For a discussion, see 2 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 563 (1968).
" Particular examples of this would be the Palestine Liberation Organization operating
from bases in Lebanon, the FLN (Algeria) from bases in Morocco and the current situation
where SWAPO (among other groups) has used bases in territories adjacent to Republic of
South Africa for staging areas. See infra note 89.
70 The most obvious example, is that of the Palestine Liberation Organization in South-
ern Lebanon during the 1970's.
7' Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 Ami. J. INT'L L.
415 (1969). An impressive collection of commentary and documents on the Arab-Israeli situ-
ation is 1-3 THE ARA-ISRAELI CONFLICT (J. Moore ed. 1974).
72 Dinstein, The Legal Issues of "Para-War" and Peace in the Middle East, in 2 THE
ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT 158 (J. Moore ed. 1974).
73 Stone, No War, No Peace in the Middle East, in 2 THE ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT 141
(J. Moore ed. 1974). See also the exchange between Falk and Stone, id. at 283.
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seen in Richard Falk's analysis of the Israeli raid on the Beirut Airport. 4
Falk mixes examples and principles drawn from the practice of states os-
tensibly at war with those drawn from the practice of states ostensibly at
peace without any clear explanation of the criteria used to make the se-
lection. Still, Falk admirably summarizes the problem:
The customary international law of reprisal does direct inquiry at
more specific features of the context than does an assessment of the com-
patibility between the Beirut raid and Charter norms. At the same time,
an inquiry using the concepts of the traditional law must necessarily
yield inconclusive results because there is no agreed way to frame the
basic issues relating to the relationship between liberation activity and
the target of a reprisal claim.7 5
Falk accurately notes that the fundamental difficulty with any in-
quiry in this area is the lack of agreed concepts. Some terms, such as
guerrilla, have a long history of use, but do not have any technical defini-
tion in international law because their historical roles did not give rise to
contexts that required assigning a specific and separate legal status to
them.76 Others embody ideological prejudgments of legitimacy. Falk es-
chews the task of constructing technical categories, opting instead to treat
all characterizations as jural equivalents.77 His subsequent analysis proves
somewhat unsatisfactory because these characterizations do not evoke
common logical referents.
Bowett's analysis suffers from a similar deficiency. Bowett leans
heavily on the Israeli-Palestinian context because he relies on incidents
that have been brought before the Security Council, but he still assumes
that the "peacetime" reprisal framework is appropriate, if inadequate.78
Falk proposes a set of general guidelines to evaluate actions in context,79
which Bowett endorses, with some qualification, while suggesting the
71 Falk, supra note 71.
71 Id. at 434.
76 Baxter has argued that "guerrilla is most usefully applied in a legal context to armed
hostilities by private persons or groups of persons who do not meet the qualifications estab-
lished in... the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1949 or corresponding provisions of
the earlier Conventions." Baxter, So-Called "Unprivileged" Belligerency: Spies, Guerrillas
and Saboteurs, 28 BmrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 333 (1951). For another attempt to distinguish guer-
rillas and terrorists, see G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 219-21
(1971). Schwarzenberger argues that none of the terms used to describe irregular forces has
any technical meaning in international law. We have suggested the term guerrilla insurgent
as the most neutral and accurate. Taulbee, Retaliation and Irregular Warfare in Contem-
porary International Law, 7 INT'L LAW. 195-96 (1973).
7 Falk, supra note 71, at 415. For a critique of this decision, see Taulbee, Guerilla
Insurgency and International Law, 12 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 187 n.6 (1972).
71 Bowett, supra note 8.
71 Falk, supra note 71, at 441-42.
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need for improved institutional procedures for collecting relevant data for
Security Council consideration." Falk's brilliant attempt to re-interpret
and elaborate the customary law by specifying procedural criteria for
evaluating each claim in light of "community expectations,"81 however,
has not held up over the past decade because the peacetime reprisal
framework, even as redefined by Falk's "second order" inquiry, does not
address the essence of the situation. Nonetheless, for purposes of analysis
it is worth reproducing here:
(1) That the burden of persuasion is upon the government that ini-
tiates an official use of force across international boundaries;
(2) That the governmental user of force will demonstrate its defen-
sive character convincingly by connecting the use of force to the protec-
tion of territorial integrity, national security, or political independence;
(3) That a genuine and substantial link exists between the prior
commission of provocative acts and the resultant claim to be acting in
retaliation;
(4) That a diligent effort be made to obtain satisfaction by persua-
sion and pacific means over a reasonable period of time, including re-
course to international organization;
(5) That the use of force is proportional to the provocation and cal-
culated to avoid its repetition in the future, and that every precaution be
taken to avoid excessive damage and unnecessary loss of life, especially
with respect to innocent civilians;
(6) That the retaliatory force is directed primarily against military
and para-military targets and against military personnel;
(7) That the user of force make a prompt and serious explanation of
its conduct before the relevant organ(s) of community review and seek
vindication therefrom of its course of action;
(8) That the use of force amounts to a clear message of communica-
tion to the target government so that the contours of what constituted
the unacceptable provocation are clearly conveyed;
(9) That the user of force cannot achieve its retaliatory purposes by
acting within its own territorial domain and thus cannot avoid interfer-
ence with the sovereign prerogatives of a foreign state;
(10) That the user of force seek a pacific settlement to the underly-
ing dispute on terms that appear to be just and sensitive to the interests
of its adversary;
(11) That the pattern of conduct, of which the retaliatory use of
force is an instance, exhibits deference to considerations (1) to (10), and
that a disposition to accord respect to the will of the international com-
munity be evident;
(12) That the appraisal of the retaliatory use of force take account
of the duration and quality of support, if any, that the target government
80 Bowett, supra note 8, at 27-32.
81 Falk, supra note 71, at 441-42.
Vol. 16:309
REPRISAL REDUX
has given to terroristic enterprises. 2
Falk's reconstruction has the merit of providing explicit operational
criteria for evaluating necessity and proportionality. The framework seeks
to constrain the occasions, intensity, duration and scope of force used in
retaliation and represents a fusion of traditional concepts with the mod-
ern idea of community review. The result redefines the right of an indi-
vidual state to use violence in a manner that minimizes the devolution
from generally agreed interpretations of Charter norms. Falk cannot be
faulted for a solution that seeks to contain violence by encouraging re-
straint because the effectiveness of international law depends heavily
upon self-interested restraint.
The framework has failed as an adequate procedural guide for two
fundamental reasons. First, it is asymmetrical in application because the
total onus of justification and restraint falls upon the state initiating a
retaliatory strike. These struggles may be conducted with limited means,
but they are for total ends insofar as the government under attack is con-
cerned. In this situation what do Paragraphs (4) and (10) signify? For a
guerrilla insurgent group that identifies its purpose as "national libera-
tion," what settlement short of capitulation would be "just and sensitive
to its interests?"
This point leads to the second deficiency. The "will of the commu-
nity" as evidenced in Security Council action and inaction reflects a di-
vergence between the declaratory views of states and their behavior in
fact; that is, a divergence between rhetoric and reality which also under-
mines the basis for self-interested restraint. Contemporary declaratory
statements clearly indicate that a government has a positive duty to take
all measures within its means to control guerrilla/terrorist attacks
launched from its national territory against other states. General Assem-
bly Resolution 2625 provides an unequivocal statement of government
obligations:
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, as-
sisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another
state or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed
towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the
present paragraph involve a threat or use of force. 83
82 Id.
83 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 123, U.N. Doc. No. A/8028 (1970). On Dec. 14, 1974,
the General Assembly adopted a definition of aggression that included the following actions
in article 3(g): "The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State or such gravity as to
amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein." G.A. Res. 3314, 39
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In reality a double standard exists because Third World statesmen
tend to see these prohibitions as selectively operative, binding on the two
super-powers (though not equally) and those states which once controlled
colonies, but not on those who act in the name of anti-colonialism, anti-
racism or other "liberation" rationales. Many believe that active enforce-
ment of the prohibition on these activities would legitimize inequitable
regimes by depriving those who would resist of their only viable alterna-
tive because they lack sufficient strength to fight using conventional
means.84 This attitude is embodied in the last effort to revise the law of
armed conflict. According to protocol I, article I, international armed con-
flict now extends to incidents "in which people are fighting against colo-
nial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the
exercise of their right of self-determination. 8 5 Article 85 describes as a
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 144, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). However, article 7 states:
Nothing in this definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way prejudice
the right of self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the
Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in... [G.A. Res.
2625], particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of
alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek
and receive support ....
Id. (emphasis added). See also 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 19) at 5, U.N. Doc. No. A/9619
(1974) (explanatory notes for articles 3 and 5 prepared by the Special Committee on the
Question of Defining Aggression).
In 1974, acting Secretary of State Kenneth Rush expressed the position of the United
States:
[R]esolution 2625 also contains the following categorical statement: "States have a
duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force." That injunction
codifies resolutions of the Security Council which have so affirmed .... [W]e
think it desirable to endeavor to maintain the distinction between acts of lawful
self-defense and unlawful reprisal.
Rovine, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 68 AM.
J. INT'L L. 736 (1974); see also 70 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 498 (1974) (commentary of Robert Rosen-
stock on G.A. Res. 3314).
84 See Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries:
Declaration on the Struggle for National Liberation (Algiers, September 5-9, 1973), in 1 0.
JANKOWITSCH & K. SAUVANT, THE THIRD WORLD WITHOUT SUPERPowERs: THE CoLLE=CTD
DOCUMENTS OF THE NON-ALIGNED CouNTrlas 207 (1978); Resolution No. 1 on Apartheid and
Racial Discrimination in South Africa, in id. at 238; Fifth Conference of Heads of State or
Government of Non-Aligned Countries (Colombo, August 1976): Political Declaration, in
id. at 747, 755-67; Resolution No. 1: South Africa, in id. at 837; Resolution No. 2: Support
and Solidarity Fund for the Liberation of Southern Africa, in id. at 842; Resolution No. 3:
Namibia, in id. at 843; Resolution No. 4: Non-Recognition of South African Bantustans, in
id. at 846; Racial Discrimination and Apartheid on the African Continent, in id. at 847.
85 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art. 1,
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977); see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II), reprinted in id. at 1442. For an extended commentary, see Farer,
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"grave breach" the "practices of apartheid and other inhuman and de-
grading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity based upon ra-
cial discrimination."'
Beyond the extension of protected status to combatant's insurgent
wars, this value-laden terminology implicitly bestows legitimacy on insur-
gency directed against "colonial domination," "alien occupation," "racist
regimes" and, in particular, "apartheid. '87 The text provides no defini-
tions for the operative terms. Taken in context with Security Council
practice over the past ten years, we can infer that aiding, abetting or even
open sponsorship of insurgencies so characterized will not incur condem-
nation. Since 1972 cases treated by the Security Council have dealt pri-
marily with the violence connected with the dissolution of the Portuguese
holdings in Africa and the ongoing challenge to the white redoubt in the
Republic of Soutfi Africa. In these cases the Security Council has applied
the following logic:
(1) Self-determination is the right of all peoples, but particularly
those peoples subjected to the evils of "colonial domination," "alien occu-
pation," "racist regimes" or "apartheid."
(2) The peoples subjected to these evils have an unquestioned right
to use force to secure self-determination.
(3) Target state responses, which involve armed force and cross an
international border, to insurgents who invoke these rationales will auto-
matically be labelled aggression by the Security Council. (See Appendix).
Yehuda Blum has noted that the consequence is to require the gov-
ernment under attack to deal with the guerrilla raiders and their sponsors
as if peace existed, while placing no correspondent obligations for re-
straint on the guerrillas and their sponsors, which in effect allows the
guerrillas to operate as if war existed.8 8 Not unexpectedly, this perception
tends to undermine rather than emphasize the incentives for restraint
Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflict: Toward the Definition of International Armed
Conflict, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 37 (1979); Green, The New Law of Armed Conflict, 15 CAN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 11-12 (1977); Schwarzenberger, From the Laws of War to the Law of Armed
Conflict, 21 CuRRENT LEGAL PROBS. 239 (1968).
86 Protocol I, supra note 85, at art. 85 (emphasis in original); see also Green, supra note
85, at 19-20.
87 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 83.
88 Blum, The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard: A Reply to Profes-
sor Falk, 64 Am. J. INT'L L. 73 (1970). In the Arab-Israeli case the concept of belligerency in
its traditional sense has been applied by the Arab states. With the exception of Egypt, the
Arab states regard Israel, not as a state, but as a belligerent entity. See Seminar of Arab
Jurists on Palestine, in 1 THE ARAB-IsRAEui CONFLICT 337 (J. Moore ed. 1974); Akehurst,
State Responsibility for the Wrongful Acts of Rebels: An Aspect of the Southern Rhode-
sian Problem, 43 BRiT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49 (1970); Schindler, State of War, Belligerency,
Armed Conflict, in THE NEw HuumfARNr LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 3 (A. Cassese ed.
1979).
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that do exist. Governments will not follow policies of restraint if they per-
ceive no positive change issuing from restraint. Over the past five years
both Israel and the Republic of South Africa have moved away from inci-
dent specific retaliation to overt "forward" strategies aimed at removing
the cause despite the avalanche of criticism that has accompanied the
change in policy.""
IV. REDEFINING THE CONTEXT: INSURGENTS AS A BELLIGERENT POWER
From the standpoint of the traditional customary law, the normative
set which governed the exercise of peacetime reprisals never applied to
the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian interaction nor to many of the other situa-
tions which involved the ongoing use of indirect coercion. To reiterate a
crucial point, Falk9" and Bowett 91 attempted to construct a position that
minimized derogation from the community prerogatives of the Charter;
that is, they attempted to minimize the conditions, other than in self-
defense, under which a state might unilaterally resort to force against a
neighbor. This approach ruled out the resurrection of the law governing
insurgent/belligerent recognition as an appropriate framework. Nonethe-
less, the law governing insurgent/belligerent recognition needs to be
examined.
Most writers distinguish between recognition of "insurgents as a bel-
ligerent power" and "insurgency." John Bassett Moore, for example, de-
fined "insurgency" as an intermediate stage between tranquility and civil
war and argued that insurgency represented no more than a domestic
proclamation calling public attention to a hazardous situation.92 In
Moore's view, insurgency did not confer international personality on the
"insurgents" because, at best, insurgency described a transitory phase in
an unstable political situation. While recognition of "insurgency" did
not confer international personality, such recognition often did have im-
portant effects on the status of the "insurgents" with respect to the mu-
nicipal law of the recognizing state. States granted recognition to insur-
gents in large part as a means to avoid categorizing participants as
common criminals because existing international law did not extend the
benefits of belligerent status to mere political revolts.9 4
Recognition of insurgents as a belligerent power had a two-fold pur-
pose. First, recognition required states to enforce neutral rights with re-
" See A Strangled State, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 1983, at 35.
Falk, supra note 71.
91 Bowett, supra note 8.
92 1 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 242 (1906).
9 Id.
C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED
STATES 198, 203 (2d ed. 1945).
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spect to both parties in the conflict.9 5 Second, recognition gave the rebels
international personality and thus made them, rather than the target gov-
ernment, legally responsible for any of their acts that adversely affected
third party interests."' The norms associated with belligerent status stip-
ulated that the rebels must have a political arm which controlled and
effectively administered a defined geographic region, in other words must
possess the qualities of a de facto state.9 7 A declaration of belligerent sta-
tus permitted a third party state to guard its own interests without hav-
ing to take the step of granting full recognition as a state to the rebel
faction. Even so, third party recognition granting belligerent status in the
absence of recognition by the target government was often viewed as an
act of intervention. Granting insurgents belligerent status sets up a situ-
ation where the target state could enforce belligerent rights against any
state that failed to enforce its neutral duties. The nineteenth century law
assumed that states, by definition, could and would protect their own in-
terests. Third party states had a duty to intern or eject guerrilla bands
(or target government troops) that fled across a border into their terri-
tory. If not, the affected party could claim a right of belligerent reprisal.99
The purpose of the traditional law was to contain and isolate the vio-
lence resulting from internal contests for legitimacy. The insurgency/bel-
ligerency framework has the virtue of explicitly stating the responsibility
of states to maintain impartiality and neutrality and of providing injured
states with a clear-cut rationale for redress if obligations are not met.
However, to use the insurgency/belligerency framework a state would
91 H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 413 (R. Tucker 2d ed. 1966).
01 Id. at 414.
17 Id at 412; see also E. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 181, 187
(1947); Fitzmaurice, Law of Treaties, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 20, 32 (1958).
9s Lauterpacht distinguishes between de facto and de jure recognition of insurgents as
belligerent communities, arguing that de jure recognition, while the lawful government still
offers resistance, constitutes "a drastic interference with the independence of the State con-
cerned." E. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 97, at 95; see also 1 J. MOORE, supra note 92, at 73.
While there may be political reasons for distinguishing between de facto and de jure recog-
nition, both give rise to the same legal effects. One of the earliest and most compelling
arguments pointing up the anomalies of this distinction can be found in Baty, So-Called
"De Facto" Recognition, 31 YALE L.J. 469 (1922). Besides, if a target government has not
itself declared a state of insurgency or belligerency, it is likely to consider any type of recog-
nition of the rebel forces an unfriendly act. See The Lilla, 15 F. Cas. 525 (D. Mass. 1862)
(No. 8348); see also J. ScoTr, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 542 (1922). Judge Ammoun, in
the Namibia case, has argued that the traditional ideas of recognition no longer apply; the
claim to belligerency flows exclusively from the right of self-determination, though without
belligerent rights toward third parties. 1971 LC.J. 92.
"9 H. KELSEN, supra note 95, at 154-62. For an excellent discussion of the political and
legal problems associated with the concept of neutrality under the Charter, see Norton, Be-
tween the Ideology and the Reality: The Shadow of the Law of Neutrality, 17 HARM. INT'L
L.J. 249 (1976). On belligerent reprisals, see generally F. KALSHOVEN, supra note 28.
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have to grant the guerrillas a legally recognized status that by implication
would enhance the legitimacy of the challenge, particularly since few con-
temporary movements meet the formal recognition tests of the traditional
law.100 For third party states the problem is often ideological and linked
to the bloc identification of the competing parties.'0 ' Hence, third party
perception of the appropriate response is not conditioned by the idea of
neutrality, but by contemporary variants of bellum justum.
As a result, in the contemporary environment the insurgency/bellig-
erency framework suffers from the same deficiencies that afflict the repri-
sals framework. We are faced with the same conundrum and answer. It
would seem clear that under some circumstances, such as the absence of a
binding Security Council decision, the customary law ought to be applica-
ble. Yet, in situations where the traditional customary law may be most
applicable, states will abjure use because, at present, rationales emphasiz-
ing "rights" override those emphasizing duties. In the most likely cases,
"wars of national liberation" that challenge existing independent govern-
ments and governments dominated by racial minorities, assertions of bel-
ligerent right would find even less consensual support than the assertion
of a right to reprisal because of the nature of the duties imposed upon
third party states and the consequent right of target states to resort to
unilateral force to compel others to perform their obligations. As Norton
argues:
These situations would involve heavily normative considerations, how-
ever, and most likely preclude reliance on the customary law of neutral-
ity. Civil wars of many sorts will undoubtedly continue to pose a major
international problem but the institution of neutrality is thus unlikely to
play a significant role in the resolution of that problem.10'
V. REPRISAL RESURGENS?
The thrust of our argument to this point is clear: neither traditional
customary law nor Charter law applies to the small scale use of force that
characterizes many of the contemporary challenges to the legitimacy of
governments. The assumptions of symmetry, reciprocity and responsibil-
ity that provided the underpinnings of the status quo guarded by the
traditional law no longer hold true. In fact, if these conditions did hold
for the present, the divorce between Charter prohibitions and state be-
100 This situation produced much of the impetus toward revising the law of armed con-
flict. See Green, supra note 85.
101 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
"' Norton, supra note 99, at 310. For an extended discussion of the contradictions dis-
cussed here and above, see Salmon, Les Guerres de Liberation Nationale, in THE NEW Hu-
MANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 55 (A. Cassese ed. 1979).
Vol. 16:309
REPRISAL REDUX
havior would be less pronounced because the successful operation of the
Charter depends upon an even-handed assessment and application of
state responsibility. As has been noted, third world states have empha-
sized the ideal of strict responsibility in principle but have refused to ap-
ply it in practice. The legal order in this case is caught between the need
to be past oriented to preserve the values of predictability and stability
and the need to be future oriented to promote the values of justice and
equity. At the moment, the majority of states seem quite willing to sacri-
fice the former to the latter. Francis Boyle concisely summarized the per-
spective, stating, "Why should states and people who believe they are op-
pressed and will be destroyed by the existing status quo accept the
illegitimacy of the threat or use of force to save themselves from it?"
10 3
In the absence of a perception that the legal order provides equitable
and effective remedies and to the extent that the members of that order
have a commitment to and actively support and pursue revolutionary and
revisionist goals, it is tempting to argue that states ought to have greater
latitude in resorting to self-help because lawbreakers ought to be pun-
ished and legitimate governments ought to be able to protect their rights.
If the prohibitions do not work, one should issue licenses. Yet, this must
be balanced against an assessment of what a rationale legitimizing retalia-
tory self-help would accomplish.
The argument for expanding the right to use self-help beyond self-
defense obviously rests upon the belief that the use of force is necessary
to maintain state rights and that the use of armed force in reprisal has,
on the whole, served to vindicate the legal order. Perhaps this corre-
sponded to reality in the period before the consolidation of the modern
centralized state and the development of any widespread acceptance of
an international legal order, but private reprisals have been outlawed
since 1856,104 and post-World War I opinions on the general function of
reprisals became increasingly critical. Bierzanek, drawing upon the de-
bates of the Institut de Droit International on the practice of peacetime
as well as belligerent reprisals, notes:
In the light of experience reprisals-particularly armed repri-
sals-proved to be an extremely unsatisfactory sanction .... They be-
came more often a pretext for justifying the illegitimate conduct of a
large State in imposing its will on a smaller State rather than a means
for enforcing observance of the rules of international law.105
103 Boyle, International Law in Time of Crisis: From the Entebbe Raid to the Hostages
Convention, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 769, 821 (1980).
104 The last vestige of private reprisals was "privateering." The states most directly
involved abolished the practice in the Declaration of Paris (April 1856). F. HINSLEY, supra
note 23, at 232-33.
105 Bierzanek, Reprisals as a Means of Enforcing the Laws of Warfare: The Old and
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The problem, of course, is that the use of force to vindicate rights
does not always mean that the rights so protected stem from legal obliga-
tions. Indeed, the danger of widening the scope of self-help is in widening
the possibility of abuse for political advantage. The probability of this
becomes greater if retaliation can be used to "teach a lesson." Contempo-
rary experience would seem to confirm the negative assessment of
Bierzanek. In no case over the past twenty-five years has force, justified
as reprisal, been used by equal against equal.106
Given these conditions, it is one thing to argue that the prohibition
on the use of force has been ineffective and quite another to argue that a
particular normative set ought to serve as a substitute. One should be
wary of responding with novel rationales that give normative blessing to
major derogations from existing obligations simply because the relevant
organs resist enforcing those obligations in a specific situation. If any-
thing, American lawyers seem too quick to justify exceptions before ex-
amining long-term impacts. One should ask what alternative normative
formulation will yield solutions considered equally applicable to guerrilla
insurgent conflicts in the Middle East, Southern Africa, Central America
and Southeast Asia?
This essay began by accepting at face value Derek Bowett's observa-
tion about the parlous state of the law. Bowett's analysis used data drawn
primarily from the Middle East because other guerrilla insurgencies had
generated little grist for Security Council consideration.107 In Bowett's de-
fense, he did use the evidence most readily available, and the resurgence
of violence in the area was, and continues to be, of great concern. How-
ever, over the past ten years the concern with guerrilla insurgent activity
has been dominated by only three situations: the continuing Arab-Pales-
tinian struggle, the liquidation of Portuguese colonial holdings, and at-
tacks on the white redoubts in Rhodesia and South Africa."'8
In the first case, we have argued that the peacetime reprisal frame-
work has never provided an adequate characterization for the confronta-
tion between Israel and its challengers because community support for
the New Law, in THE NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 237 (A. Cassese ed.
1979). Along these same lines, see the arguments in F. GROB, supra note 9, at 243.
106 See G. vON GLAHN, supra note 15, at 558-59
107 Bowett, supra note 8.
108 Obviously this does not exhaust the roll call of situations where force has come into
play. Other guerrilla insurgencies exist, for example in Burma, Laos and Thailand, but these
have remained localized. The guerrilla insurgency in Burma has been more or less active
since World War II. At the time of this writing, we count 21 active conflicts. Apart from
those instances mentioned in the text, the issues of retaliation discussed here are poten-
tially relevant only to those conflicts in Central America (Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salva-




the symmetry of obligation essential to the effective operation of the
traditional normative set is missing. In fact the situation has moved from
one of "like kind" retaliation to overt intervention and open warfare. The
Portuguese claims resulted from a last ditch defense of their colonial em-
pire. As such they were systematically rejected by the Security Council
and represent, at the least, the ante-penultimate scenes in the legitimate
anti-colonial movement. In the cases of South Africa and Rhodesia, a ne-
gotiated settlement ended the Rhodesian insurgency, leaving South Af-
rica alone. Because South Africa has been virtually stripped of its mem-
bership rights in the General Assembly, it is difficult to envision
widespread support for any rationale that would extend to South Africa
the right to use unilateral force in retaliation across a recognized border
against guerrilla insurgent movements operating. from contiguous
territories.
Outside of these situations, the most disquieting uses of force have
not been in connection with guerrilla insurgencies. The most disturbing
trend is the increased willingness of the community to tolerate large-scale
overt violence against isolated or unpopular governments: Tanzania on
Uganda, China on Vietnam, and Iraq on Iran. We would suggest that the
real pressure on article 2(4) of the Charter is not the incidence of prac-
tices connected with guerrilla insurgency but the normative silence that
followed these overt attacks. The real crisis in the contemporary law
comes not from the marginal cases of low level guerrilla violence but from
a community refusal to make a good faith effort to deal with paradigm
cases of overt aggression.
VI. REPRISE
We cannot dispute the observation that the security structure er-
ected by the Charter seems increasingly irrelevant to the control of con-
flict in the contemporary world and that, in consequence, states see an
increased need for measures of self-help. We have also argued that ana-
lytically and practically, reprisals can be distinguished from self-defense.
We, however, resist the conclusion that the legal order ought to recognize
and authorize the resort to reprisal through an explicit rationale.
Arguments that turn on the necessity of altering current prohibitions
to be in conformity with the reality of state practice are inherently unper-
suasive for three reasons:
(1) Those arguments rest upon events and situations that are transi-
tory or which are not amenable to control through legal means;
(2) The idea that the law should authorize what it cannot constrain
is especially pernicious; and finally,
(3) The continuing impact of the three-fold ideological split that has
undermined the effectiveness of the United Nations has also precluded
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evolution of a new rationale that would be equally acceptable to all
parties.
The burden of proof still remains with those who would sacrifice the
long-range vision of the Charter to the short term demands of states. In
the short run, we argue that the prudent course is to tolerate certain
practices when necessity demands rather than investing them with the
sanctity of a legal rule. The seeming disorder of contemporary life should
not diminish the vision of the Charter. We fail to see the positive gains of
retreating from the formulations of the Charter. Conversely, we should
note that legitimizing force as a means of retaliation might be giving nor-
mative blessing to political chaos.'0 9
Realists may argue that this position merely leads to manipulation
and cynicism about the nature and applicability of international law be-
cause the Charter demands too much. As a position, however, we much
prefer the cynicism which arises from frustration with "utopia" to that
which arises from the perception of international law as the obedient ser-
vant of state desires. If hypocrisy is the due thdt vice pays to virtue, the
set of virtues that hypocrites feel obliged to honor in passing does make a
difference. The changes in the last forty years have not diminished the
goals of the Charter; rather, they have pointed up their desirability.
109 Hoffmann, International Law and the Control of Force, in THE RELEVANCE OF IN-




Selected Incidents Before the Security Council Involving the
Use of Force: 1971-82
Incident Nature Argument in Justification Security Council Action
Senegal Portuguese Portugal claimed self Condemnation of
19 June 1971 anti-tank mine defense and also claimed Portugal. Direct Portugal
kills officials. that the mine not to halt all such acts. Act
Portuguese. Did not not preceded by attempt
appear at Security to resolve the issue
Council. peacefully.
Zambia South African South African forces No condemnation, but
5 October 1971 police violated were pursuing terrorists admonished to observe
Zambian into sanctuary. territorial integrity.
border.
Senegal Portuguese Command error, those Condemns Portugal
12 October 1972 forces attack responsible would be
outpost punished
Zambia South Africa/ Self defense in response Condemns both South
January 1973 Rhodesia close to terrorist attacks from Africa and Rhodesia




Portuguese Indonesia Indonesia used troops SC calls for cease fire
Timor attacks only to restore order in and the withdrawal of
7 December 1974 East Timor East Timor because troops; calls on Portugal
Portugal said could not to speed movement to
independence.
Angola South African To protect nationals Condemned South Africa
April 1976 forces into working on dams in for aggression
Angola Angola because Portugal
said she could not.
Zambia Attack on South Africa disavowed Condemned South Africa
11 July 1976 Zambian any knowledge of the 'for the attack.
border incident.
Mozambique Rhodesian None given Condemns aggressions by
January - land/air S. Rhodesia and
May 1977 attacks against condemns S. Africa for
border villages supporting Rhodesia.
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Incident Nature Argument in Justification Security Council Action
Angola South African None given Condemned South
8 - 13 March air force and African aggression for an




Angola South African To destroy SWAPO Condemned South Africa
8-16 March attacks on bases in Angola for violations of
1979 SWAPO sovereignty and
refugee centers territorial integrity.
Angola South African Attack on SWAPO bases Condemned South Africa




Zambia South African Attack on SWAPO bases Condemnation of South
January 1980 raids into in Zambia in retaliation Africa
Zambia for terrorist attacks
Angola South African Against SWAPO bases Condemnation of South
26 June 1980 raids into Africa
Angola
Angola South African To destroy SWAPO Condemnation of South
27 August 1981 raid into bases Africa vetoed by the
Angola United States
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